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PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: 
THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING 
John V. Orth* 
We must never forget that it is a[n eighteenth-century] consti-
tution we are expounding. 
John Marshall 
Presidential impeachment and removal from office undoes 
the result of the last presidential election. So much is indubita-
bly true. What is not true is that the Framers of the Constitution 
necessarily understood this to mean a rejection of the people's 
choice. The Constitution's Executive Article, Article II, pro-
ceeds in logical order: Section 1 concerns the election of the 
President, Section 2 the President's powers, Section 3 the Presi-
dent's relations with Congress, and Section 4 the President's im-
peachment and removal from office. Section 4 is, in other words, 
the negative analog of Section 1; the election of the President 
and the President's removal from office are the brackets that en-
close the substance of the Executive Article. The architecture of 
the Constitution, therefore, suggests that something about the 
original understanding of presidential impeachment and removal 
may be learned from an examination of the process of presiden-
tial election. 
The American President has never, of course, been directly 
elected by the people. Rather, the President is elected by "elec-
tors" chosen by the states: "Each state shall appoint, in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Elec-
tors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representa-
tives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... "1 
The electors meet in their respective states and vote for two per-
sons, one of whom at least must not be an inhabitant of the same 
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state.- According to the original plan, the person with the great-
est number of votes, assuming it was a majority of the electoral 
votes, would become President and the runner-up Vice-
President.3 As it turned out, the choice of the President went ac-
cording to plan only three times: in 1789 and 1793, when George 
Washington and John Adams were chosen, and in 1797, when 
the ill-assorted team of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson pre-
vailed. The experience of the 1801 election, when Thomas Jef-
ferson and Aaron Burr each received the same number of elec-
toral votes, led to the prompt proposal and adoption of the 
Twelfth Amendment, which created the present system of dis-
tinct electoral ballots for President and Vice-President.4 
It is a commonplace of American constitutional history that 
the Framers did not foresee the development of a system of du-
rable nationwide political parties. In the words of a distin-
guished historian: "the [Constitutional] Convention, not antici-
pating the rise of a two-party system, expected each state to vote 
for a 'favorite son,' so that seldom would one candidate obtain a 
majority of electoral votes. . . . Madison thought this would 
happen 'nineteen times out of twenty' .... "5 Careful provision 
was therefore made for the election of the President in case no 
candidate received a majority of the electoral votes. The House 
of Representatives, then the only directly elected element of the 
federal government, was designated by the Constitution to make 
the choice: "[F]rom the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the 
House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, 
the President. "6 The deadlocked electors would, therefore, be 
replaced by a new set of electors, the Representatives. In recog-
nition of their new role the Representatives would vote in an ex-
traordinary manner, not by individual Yeas and Nays but by bal-
lot as delegates from the several states: "[I]n choosing the 
2. U.S. Const., Art. II. § 1, cl. 3; U.S. Const., Amend. XII (superseding similar 
provision in Art. II,§ 1. cl. 3). 
3. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ I, cl. 3 (superseded by U.S. Const., Amend. XII). 
4. The key provision in the Twelfth Amendment instructed the electors to "name 
in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted 
for as Vice-President." 
5. Samuel Eliot Morison. et a!., 1 The Grmnh of the American Republic 254-55 
(Oxford U. Press. 7thcd. 1980). 
6. U.S. Const., Amend. XII (superseding provision in U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 3, 
directing House of Representatives to choose from among the five highest on the list). 
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President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote." 7 
The drafters, both of the original Constitution and of the 
Twelfth Amendment, expected the House of Representatives to 
play a major role in presidential elections, as indeed it would 
have, had a party system not developed to operate the constitu-
tional machinery. National parties focused attention on a lim-
ited number of candidates and organized the electors behind the 
party's choice. Only in 1825, when the party system fractured, 
did a majority of electors not unite behind one person. The re-
sult in that case, when the House chose the austere John Quincy 
Adams over the popular Andrew Jackson, did not commend the 
process.8 
While the Twelfth Amendment tinkered with the constitu-
tional mechanism, the emergence of parties altered its actual op-
eration beyond recognition. The development of the party sys-
tem, however, changed only half the constitutional equation: 
presidential election but not presidential removal. The House of 
Representatives, which had been expected to elect the President 
more often than not, was almost never called upon to play its 
constitutional role in the choice of the President, but it retained 
unaltered "the sole Power of Impeachment. "9 
As the presidential selection process came to approximate 
direct popular election, the logical analog would have been pro-
vision for recall elections, in which the people acting directly (or 
through electors) could remove an executive in whom they had 
lost confidence. 10 The United States Constitution is, however, 
notoriously difficult of amendment, and many of the amend-
ments that have been ratified (like the Twelfth) are triggered by 
crises such as the deadlock in the Electoral College in 1801. 
Presidential impeachment has, thankfully, been a rarity. 
As originally designed, then, the constitutional architecture 
was symmetrical: the House of Representatives, the only federal 
body involved in choosing the President, was also the only fed-
eral body that could initiate proceedings for the President's re-
7. U. S. Const., Amend. XII (superseding similar provision in U.S. Const.. Art. II, 
§ I, cl. 3). 
8. Morison, I The GrowiJz of the American Republic at 412-13 (cited in note 5). 
9. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 5. 
I 0 Oregon pioneered the recall election with a constitutional amendment in 1908; 
by 1915 eleven states had followed Oregon's lead. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A Har-
bison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Deve/opmen/641 (W.W. Norton & 
Co., 4th ed. 1970). 
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moval. It was also practical: removal might be more likely in 
those cases, expected to be frequent, when the majority of elec-
tors could not agree on one candidate and the House made the 
choice for them. Had the House of Representatives developed 
into a real Electoral College, as anticipated, it was the logical 
body to begin the reconsideration of its choice. 
The Framers' misunderstanding of the role the House 
would play in presidential elections distorted the arrangements 
they made for presidential impeachment. Their failure to antici-
pate the rise of the party system destroyed the constitutional 
symmetry they had so carefully devised. The political system 
that actually developed affected presidential election and presi-
dential removal differently. The party discipline and organiza-
tion needed to secure a majority of electors did not necessarily 
translate into a majority in the House of Representatives, and 
the very different constituencies provided for the House of Rep-
resentatives and the President meant that popular opinion bore 
on the two in very different ways. For the same reason, national 
opinion polls, so prevalent in the late twentieth century but un-
foreseen in the late eighteenth century, could not really provide 
the functional equivalent of the recall election. 
Thus when the modern House of Representatives initiates 
the process of presidential removal, it threatens to overturn 
someone else's decision, contrary to the Framers' expectations, 
and in consequence the House should act with a reserve that 
would not be necessary when having second thoughts about its 
own choice for chief executive. Treason and bribery are obvious 
grounds for removal and are unsurprisingly enumerated in the 
Constitution as impeachable offences; 11 the former expressly de-
fined elsewhere in the text, 12 the latter defined at common law 
before American Independence. 13 It is the debatable and ill-
defined "high crimes and misdemeanors," presumably added to 
the list of impeachable offences to encompass unforeseen viola-
tions, that requires most interpretation and that is therefore 
most subject to abuse. The invocation of this cause requires the 
greatest care, particularly when the House proposes to reject a 
choice made elsewhere. The impeachments both of President 
Andrew Johnson in 1868 and of President Bill Clinton in 1999 
II. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4. 
12. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 3, cl. 1. 
13. Sec, e.g., William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 139-40 
(Oxford, 1769). 
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demonstrate the use that partisanship, another by-product of the 
political party system that reshaped the constitutional process, 
can make of that elastic phrase. 
History has not rewritten the constitutional provisions con-
cerning presidential impeachment any more than it has rewritten 
the constitutional provisions concerning presidential election, 
but it has dramatically altered the reality of the two processes. It 
is perhaps too much to expect political partisans not to exploit 
every opening left by text and context, but constitutional com-
mentators can at least point out that the original words do not 
necessarily express the original intention. 
The eighteenth-century constitution is gone beyond recall; 
to recover it one would have to recreate the eighteenth century. 
One aspect misunderstood distorts the understanding of all re-
lated aspects. Time and practice eventually efface the original 
design, and to focus on one feature at the expense of others pro-
duces only unanticipated results, despite the appearance of fidel-
ity. Adhering to original understandings maintains the original 
arrangements only if everything else remains the same-which it 
never does. 
